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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

MINI SPAS, INC., d/b/a
THE KING'S PALACE and
RUSTY HANNA, et al., d/b/a
THE SOCIETY OF LICENSED
MASSEURS
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
Case No. 18,076

vs.
STATE OF UTAH, SCOTT M.
MATHESON, UTAH STATE
DEPARTMENT OF. REGISTRATION,
and PAUL T. FORDHAM
Defendants and
Respondents.
---0000000---

.BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
---0000000---

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This action for declaratory judgment was brought in the
Third District Court of Salt Lake County by Mini Spas, Inc.,
a Utah Corporation operating a massage establishment; and a
group of masseurs.

Plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment on

two causes of action.

First, that the Massage Practice Act of

1981 be construed by the Court to· permit the Division of
Registration to create the Utah Board of Massage.

Second,

that a Writ of Mandamus be issued to compel the Division of
Registration to create such a Board.
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-2DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
There being no material facts in dispute, Plaintiffs
and Defendants moved for Summary Judgment, which was granted
to Defendants on both causes.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a judgment by the Court construing the
Massage Practice Act of 1981 to eliminate the internal inconsistency by allowing licensing of Massage Technicians
who have engaged in the practice of massage in the State of
Utah for five (5) years before July 1, 1981 and who meet all
the age and moral requirements specified in the act.

Further,

Appellant seeks a Writ of Mandamus requiring the Utah State
Division of Registration to organize a Board of Massage and
allow the Board to carry out its functions as specified in
U.C.A. 58-47-1 et seq.
Alternatively Appellant seeks a remand of this case to
,the lower court: for· determination of the· Utah State Legislature's
intent and purpose in passing the Massage Practice Act of 1981.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Massage Practice Act of 1981 was enacted by the
Utah Legislature in February of 1981.

The purpose of the

Act, according to this title, is as follows:

"An Act relating

to massage practice; providing for a Board of Massage; providing for licensure;and the setting, implementation and enforcemeLt of standards for massage technicians and massage
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-3establishments; and providing for an effective date."
However, there was an oversight in the drafting of the
Act which has prevented its implementation.

The problem is

simply that the Board of Massage is to consist of one layman
and four licensed massage technicians (see §58-47-3 U.C.A.).
The Board of Massage must supervise and direct the administration of oral and written examinations which all applicants
must pass before becoming licensed massage technicians.
Therefore, no one can become a licensed massage technician in
Utah until passing the examinations administered by the Board
of Massage; but the Board of Massage cannot be constituted
unless four licensed massage technicians can be found to sit
on the Board.

At the present time there are no massage tech-

nicians licensed by the State of Utah; and this statute has
not been implemented by the Division of Registration of the
Department of Business regulation although the date of implementation, July 1, 1981 has passed.
The City of South Salt Lake is currently attempting to
regulate massage practice in spite of the fiact that the State
Legislature has passed comprehensive legislation providing for
the state regulation of that practice.

The ordinance passed

by the city in its attempt to regulate massage practice poses
the real and serious threat to the appellants of actually
regulating their chosen line of work out of existence.

Once

the Massage Practice Act is effectuated the South Salt Lake
City ordinances regulating massage practice in conflict with
the state scheme will be inapplicable.
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Plaintiff brought suit for declaratory judgment in the
Third District Court of Salt Lake County seeking to construe
the state statute in such a manner as to allow its implementation.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied and

the District Court held that the statute, §58-47-1 U.C.A.,
et seq., was not overly broad, vague, or null and void, that.
the Court could not make changes in the wording of the statue,
since it is a matter of Legislative Jurisdiction, no Writ of
Mandamus could issue.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN PASSING THE :MASSAGE PRACTICE ACT OF 1981 THE
UTAH LEGISLATURE'S INTENT WAS TO PASS A VALID LAW PROVIDING
FOR THE CREATION OF A BOARD OF :MASSAGE.
Various profession, trades and occupations in Utah are
regulated under title 58 of the Utah Code Annotated.
provides:

§58-1-l(a)

There shall be a division of the State Government

within the Department of Business Regulation known as the
"Division of Registration," which shall be charged with
administering the laws regulation professions, trades and occupations as in this title provided.

§5 of the same chapter

provides:
The functions of the Division of Registration shall
be exercised . . . with the collaboration and assistance
of representative committees, whether termed committees
or boards, of the several professions, trades and occupations regulated under this title.
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-5§6 (1) provides that the Director of Registration shall
designate the numbers of the representative committees referred to in §58-1-5.
Chapter 47 of this title, the Massage Practice Act,
outlining the requirements for the creation of a Board of
Massage calls for the creation of such a board according to
standard requirements established in §58-1-6 U.C.A. for
professions, trades and occupations under the Registration
Division.

One of the standard requirements is that four (4)

of the five (5) board members be licensed practitioners in
good standing of the profession.

However, it is apparent that

the legislature was either ignorant of, or neglected to make
allowance for the fact, that there are no licensed practitioners
in good standing in the occupational category of massage technician; because it did not change the requirements for the appointment of the original Board of Massage to allow for that
fact.

This oversight has resulted in the impossibility of

implementing the law as it is literally written.

This problem

was stated as follows in a letter dated May 28, 1981 from
Counsel for Appellees to Counsel for Appellants:
The problem that we are facing in trying to create
the Board as directed in the statute is as follows:
Up to this time there has been no licensed masseurs
under this Act or any other state act in the State of Utah.
(30) [now section 58-1-5 U.C.A.] calls for the establishing the Board with 'licensed' massage technicians. Nowhere in the Act has anyone been 'grandfathered' in, and
before anyone can be appointed, including those that have
been in practice for more than five years, they must be
examined. The exam is to be given by and under the direction of the Board. We do not see how we can appoint a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-6Board of Licensed Massage Technicians when there are no
licensed technicians to draw from.
There have been other boards created for the purpose
of establishing the Board, certain individuals have been
given special status. That was not done here, nor is
there any provision in the act where a board can be
impaneled to give the examination to licensed individuals.
It is not to be assumed that the legislature makes the
practice of participating in exercises of futility by intentionally passing invalid or impossible laws.

On the contrary,

our form of government requires us to recognize the fact that
when the legislature passes a law, that is has a purpose and
intends that law to be valid.
The courts are obligated to make that presumption when
dealing with statutory law.

This court held in Millett v Clark

Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (Utah 1980):
It is to be observed, morover, that statutory
enactments are to be so construed as to render
all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and
that interpretations are to be avoided which render
some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd.
609 P.2d at 936.
In the case of Salt Lake City v Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 741
(Utah 1977) this court held that rules of construction were
to be used only as aids in determining legislative intent and
were not to get in the way of putting that intent into effect,
as evidenc·ed

by the act as a whole, and wrote:

An even more fundamental rule of statuatory interpretation helpful here is that the statute should be looked at
in its entirety and in accordance with the purpose which
was sought to be accomplished. 568 P.2d at 741.
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-7This same holding was made in the case of Osuala v Aetna Life

& Casualty, 608 P.2d 242 (Utah 1980), where the Court observed:
If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or
application of an act, it is appropriate to analyze
the act in its entirety, in the light of its objective,
and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with the
legislative intent and purpose. 608 P.2d at 243.
Also, in Robert H. Hinckley Inc. v State Tax Commission,
404 P.2d 662 (Utah 1965), in construing the legislative
act calling for collection of sales taxes, the Court allowed a
vendor who did business in an unusual manner to use an alternative system to the "bracket method" mandated by the State Tax
Commission, but which did not work for this particular business.

In doing so, the Court stated,
We cannot ascribe to the legislature an intent to
make it impossible for a vendor to conform with
its requirements. 404 P.2d at 668.
Again in Curtis v Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d

1044 (Utah 1978), this Court stated:
A sound rule of statutory interpretation is that a
statute is presumed not to be intended to produce
absurd consequences and that where possible it will
be given a reasonable and sensible construction.
This Court recognizes its duty to render such interpretation of the laws as will best promote the protection of the public. 575 P.2d at 1046.
Finally, this Court held in Greaves v State, 528 P.2d
805 (Utah 1974):
Because the duty rests upon the courts to determine
the scope of the powers of all three branches of
government, they have a special responsibility to
exercise a high degree of caution.and restraint to
keep themselves within the limitations of the
judicial power, in order not to infringe upon the
prerogatives of the executive or the legislative
branches. In harmony with that policy, it is the
well-established rule that legislative enactments
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are endowed with a strong presumption of validity,
and that they should not be declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis upon which
they can be found to come within the constitutional
framework; and that a statute will not be stricken
down as being unconstitutional unless it appears to
be so beyond a reasonable doubt. 528 P.2d at 806, 807.
It appears to be the contention of Appellees herein that
this Court has the option of leaving this law intact as written;
but admit that it now makes no sense, and so should be ignored
until the legislature has corrected its error.

Appellants

have cited no authority for this strange suggestion, and it
appears from the authorities researched by Appellants that
the only alternative this Court may have is to declare the
statute void for vagueness.

This, of course, is a result

which neither side seeks, and one which would be to the
detriment of all parties.
The intention of the Utah State Legislature to pass a
valid Massage Practice Act providing for a functioning
Board of Massage is further borne out by an examination of
the responsibilities given by the legislature to the Board.
§58-47-8 U.C.A. provides:
Any person who . . . presents a diploma or credentials issued by a school of massage approved by
the American Massage and Therapy Association or
its successor or like institute, representing study
as determined by the Board of up to 1,000 hours and
who passes a reasonable demonstrative, oral, and
written examination, conducted by and under the
supervision and direction of the Board, in the art
of massage by hand . . . shall be entitled to be
licensed and to be issued a license as a massage
technician.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-90bviously, the Board of Massage is intended by the
legislature to function as a viable unit with definite
responsibilities and duties in regard to the licensing of
massage technicians.

Further, §58-47-10 gives the Board

authority to enter into reciprocal license agreements with
other states.

§58-47-11 gives the Board the authority to

administer examinations to candidates for apprentice massage
technicians.

After the successful completion of the examina-

tion specified by .the Board, the candidates may be licensed
as Apprentice Massage Technicians by the Department of Business Regulation.

The Board has other responsibilities in

the evaluation of physical or mental competence of practitioners

(§58-47-12), discipline within the occupation (§58-47-20) and
in formulating post-graduate requirements for practitioners

(§58-47-15).

The obvious intent of the legislature in passing

the Massage Practice Act was to provide for ·the licensing and
regulation of massage technicians and establishments through
the Division of Registration and the Utah Board of Massage.
It is equally obvious that in following the standards set
in the General Provisions of Title 58, the legislature
unintentionally created an impossible situation due to the
fact that there were no massage technicians already licensed
by the State of Utah at the time the Massage Practice Act
was passed.

The simple fact that the legislature could have

made special provisions for the formation of the original
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-10board, taking into account the fact that there were no
licensed practitioners in Utah, but failed to do so, does
not indicate an intent to create an impossible situation,
but rather indicates a simple oversight.

This oversight

can be legitimately rectified by this Court, by "grandfathering" in a certain category of massage practitioners
as suggested by Appellants.
Should this Court decide that the legislative intent
is not adequately clear for a determination at this point,
Appellant requests the remand of this case to a lower court
for a determination of the legislative intent.
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD INTERPRET THE MASSAGE PRACTICE ACT
OF 1981 IN HARMONY WITH THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE, AND
IN SO DOING RESOLVE THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN TWO PROVISIONS
OF THE ACT.
Appellants do not maintain that all laws passed by the
legislature are valid simply because the legislature intended
them to be valid, but the courts must give the laws the presumption of validity.
This Court stated in Norville v State Tax Commission,
97 P.2d 937 (Utah 1940):
Statutes ~uly enacted by the legislature are presumed to be constitutional and valid (citations)
omitted). When there is ambiguity in the terms of
a statute or when it is susceptible of two interpretations one of which would render it unconstitutional and the other bring it within the constitutional sanctions, the Court is bound to choose that
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-11interpretation which would uphold the statute,
and to pronounce a statute unconstitutional
only when the case is so clear as to be free
from doubt (citations omitted).
97 P.2d at
939.
The Court then went on to deal with problems in statutory
language as follows:
As stated in Sutherland on Statutory Construction,
§271, at page 320:
'In the exposition of a statute
the intention of the law-maker will prevail over
the literal sense of the terms; and its reason
and intention will prevail over the strict letter.'
97 P.2d at 939.
Quoting from Endlich on the Interpretation of Statutes,
§319, the Court stated:
A mistake apparent on the face of an act, which
may be corrected by other language of the act,
is never fatal.
In all such cases it may, with
propriety, be said that the context rectifies
the error, and it is not the Court that assumes
to correct the legislature ... The Judicial Interpreter may deal with careless and inaccurate words
and phrases in the same spirit as a critic dealswith an obscure or corrupt text, when satisfied,
on solid grounds, from the context or history of
the enactment, or from the injustice,- inconvenience,
or absurdity of the consequences to which it would
lead, then the language thus treated does not really
express the intention and that this amendment
probably does.
97 P.2d at 941.
Thus we see, that the Courts have the power to determine
ambiguities in statutes, and to 'change words or phrases in
statutes when that is needed in order to avoid an absurdity.
The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, in commenting on
when such an ambiguity exists and when the Court should exercise its power to change language to effectuate a statute,
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-12stated as follows, in the case of State v Rawson, 312 P.2d
849 (Or. 1957):
The Courts hold that even if an act is expressed in
clear language, a conclusion may be warranted that
an ambiguity exists if literal interpretation will
produce an absurd result or one at variance with the
policy of the legislature as a whole (citations
omitted).
From Am Jur. we quote with approval:
'An ambiguity,
justifying the interpretation of a statute, is not
simply that arising fr0m the meaning of particular
words, but includes such as may arise in respect to
the general scope and meaning of a statute when all
its provisions are examined. The Courts regard an
ambiguity to exist where the legislature has enacted
two or more provisions or statutes which appear to
be inconsistent. There is also authority for the
rule that uncertainty as to the meaning of the statute
may arise from the fact that giving a literal interpretation to the words would lead to such unreasonable,
unjust, impractical, or absurd consequences as to
compel a conviction that they could not have been
intended by the legislature.' 312 P.2d at 856.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to
·ascertain the meaning of the legislature and give
it effect, if such meaning is constitutional. In
determining the intent many things are taken into
consideration: language, the object to be accomplished, whether a literal interpretation of the
language will lead to an impossibility or an
absurdity, the history behind the act, and numerous other matters, no one of which is absolutely
controlling as the legislative intent. It is from
a combination of all these that the intent is
deduced .... 312 P.2d at 857.
This decision was followed by the Court of Appeals of
Oregon in Baird v Electro Mart Factory Direct, Inc., 47
Or. App. 565, 615 P.2d 335 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) where the
Court stated:
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-13Because that legislative. intent is manifest we
must give effect to that intention even though
to do so does violation to the literal meaning
of its words (citation omitted). 615 P.2d at 338.
Only if this Court cannot find a reasonable and ration.al
means of construing this statute and making it a valid law
which can be implemented by the administrative body responsible
for its execution, should it be declared invalid.

This Court

stated in a 1978 case that:
A sound rule of statutory interpretation is that
a statute is presumed not to be intended to produce absurd consequences and that where possible
it will be given a reasonable and sensible construction. This Court recognizes it~ duty to
render such interpretation of the laws as will
best promote the protection of the public. Curtis
v Harmon Electronics, Inc. 575 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1978)
To successfully give a reasonable and sensible construction
to a statute the Courts are occasionally required to modify to
some degree the

lang~age

found in the statutes.

This Court

would have to make a simple change in the Massage Practice
Act of 1981 to eliminate the impossible situation dictated by ·
the literal reading of the words of the act.

The change sought

by Appellants is to strike out the words requiring massage
practitioners who meet the moral and age requirements of the
act and who have engaged in the practice of massage in the
State of Utah for five years before July l, 1981, or who meet
the education requirements, to pass the oral and written examinations specified in §58-47-8 U.C.A.

This simple change

would "grandfather" in a reasonably small group of massage
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practitioners under the act.

Such a resolution of this

problem by this Court would be in harmony with the legislative
intent as well as generally accepted and appropriate judicial
interpretation of statutory law.
In giving effect to the intent of the legislature, the
Courts may occasionally find it necessary to alter in some
way the wording of some provision(s) of an act.
predicament here.

Such is the

This has lead the Appellees to conjure up

the constitutional principle of separation of powers which
was summed up very succinctly by this Court in Young v Salt
Lake City, 67 P. 1066 (1902)
It is ture that under the constitution, powers
belonging to one department of government cannot
be exercised by others. Courts cannot legislate
or make 1 aws.
In further support of this principle, the Appellees cite
in their Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary
Judgment, the case of Kimball v City of Grantsville, 57 P. 1
(1899).
Independently of any repugnance between a legislative
act, and any constitutional limitation or restriction,
a court has no power to arrest its execution, however
unwise or unjust, in the opinion of the court, it may
be or whatever motives may have lead to its enactment.
Accepting this as sound doctrine, as we safely may,
would not the judicial department itself be guilty of
transcending its constitutional power were it to
inquire into the expediency, wisdom, or justice of
the legislation in question in this case?
This, in itself, would be an abuse, because it would
be an usurpation of power by one department of the
government which the people absolutely vested in
another.
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-15In citing this principle of the separation of powers,
Appellees have incorrectly identified the issue.

Appellants

do not seek to undermine the principle of separation of powers.
Appellants in no way request the Court to take upon itself
any power properly vested in the legislative branch of government.

Rather, Appellants request that this Court exercise its

proper function in interpreting the statutory law promulgated
by the other branch of government.

The Courts have commonly

recognized the necessity of departing at times from the
strict language of a statute.
30 N.W. 2d 296

In Board of Regents v Gillette,

the Court stated:

The rule is that words may be supplied by the
Court in construing a statute where that is
necessary to complete the sense thereof and
give effect to the intention of the legislature
manifested therein. This rule is especially
applicable where it is necessary to do so to
present the law from becoming a nullity.
30
N.W. 2d at 301.
The Missouri Court stated. in Leibson v Henry, 204 S. W. 2d
310 (MO 1947):
It is a general rule that the courts, in the
interpretation of a statute, may not take, strike,
or read anything out of a statute, or delete, subtract, or omit anything therefrom.
To the contrary,
it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that
significance and effect should, if possible, be
accorded to every word, phrase, sentence, and part
of the act. However, there are cases in which
words of a statute are so meaningless or inconsistent with the intention of the legislature
otherwise plainly expressed in the statute, that
th~y.may be rejected as surplussage, and omitted,
eliminated or disregarded.
(quoted from 50 Am.
Jur. Statutes, §31, page 219) 204 S.W. 2d at 350.
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-16In People v Stratton, 335 Ill. 455, 167 N.E. (Ill. 1929),
the Supreme Court of Illinois, referring to the intention of
the legislature in enacting a statutory provision, stated:
In giving effect to such intention, 'words may be
modified, altered, omitted, or supplied so as to
obviate any ·repugnancy or inconsistency with
the legislative intent' (citations omitted).
'In
construing a statute the court will not be confined
·;:o its, literal meaning. A thing within the inten~ion is regarded within the statute although not
within the letter.' (citations omitted). 167 N.E.
at 31.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also follows this
principle as expressed in Town of Clayton v Colorado and S. RY.
Company, 51 F.2d 977 (Tenth Cir. 1931).
The primary rule in the construction of statutes
is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of a
legislative body. (citations omitted). Where the
language of the statute is plain and unambiguous,
and conveys a clear and definite meaning, resort
must not be had, ordinarily, to rules of construction,
but the statutes must be given its plain and obvious
meaning.
(citations omitted).
Where, however, the language is of. doubtful meaning,
or where· adherence to the strict letter would lead
to injustice or absurdity, or result in contradictory
provisions, it devolves upon the courts to ascertain
the true meaning. (citations omitted).
The general design and purpose of a statute should
be kept in mind and its provisions should be given a
fair and reasonable construction with a view to perfecting its purpose and object.
(citations omitted).
51 F.2d at 979.
In the same case the Tenth Circuit also stated:
It frequently happens that the true intention of a
legislative body is not expressed by the language
employed in the statute, when literally construed.
In such cases, the intent of such legislative body
can only be effectuated by a departure from a
literal interpretation of the language employed.
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-17Where such intention is plainly discernable from
the provisions of the statute when considered as
a whole, the real purpose and intent of the legislative body will prevail over the literal import
of the words employed. 51 f .2d at 979.
In Norville v State Tax Commission, this Court cited a
Montana case, as follows:
When the intention [of the legislature] can be
gathered from the statute, words may be modified,
altered, or supplied to give to the enactment the
force and effect which the legislature intended.
97 P.2d at 940.
It is clear therefore, that this Court has the power and
the responsibility to construe the Massage Practice Act in
accordance with the intent of the legislature which intent
can be determined quite clearly by a reading of the entire
act.

As the North Dakota Court said in Golden Valley Country

v Lundin, 203 N.W. 316 (N.D. 1925):
But the legislative intention must be sought from
the whole act, and not merely from parts of it;
and where certain parts of an act are inconsistent
with other provisions of the same act, then it
becomes incumbent upon the courts to determine
which must prevail in order to carry out the legislative purpose and intention. 203 N.W. at 319.
The intent of the Utah State Legislature would best be
implemented under the Massage Practice Act of 1981 by
"grandfathering" in and licensing a small category of massage
technicians which would permit the establishment of the Board
of Massage and the effective regulation by the state of
massage technic.ians and massage establishments.
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-18POINT III
THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS APPROPRIATE TO
CO:MPEL THE APPELLEES TO CARRY OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES IN
ESTABLISHING THE UTAH BOARD OF MASSAGE AND IMPLEMENTING THE
MASSAGE PRACTICE ACT OF 1981.
The construction of the Massage Practice Act of 1981 in
accordance with the intent of the legislature would require
action by the Division of Registration of the Department of
Business Regulation.

However, as mantfested by the letter of

May 28, 1981 sent to Counsel for the Appellants by Counsel for
the Appellees, the Division will take no action until instructed
by the Court.
The propriety of the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus
requiring the Division of Registration to perform its duty
is clear from this Court's disposition of the case of Archer
v Utah s·tate Land Boa·rd, 392 P. 2d 622 (Utah 1964).

The Court

first stated that:
[T]here appears to be ample constitutional,
statutory, and case law authority giving and
vesting in the several district courts authority
to issue Writs in the nature of Mandamus when it
is made to appear that the Administrative Board
or officer has a clear statutory duty to perform
a certain act and it or he refuses to do so.
(392 P.2d at 623).
The Court subsequently dealt with the issue of soverign
immunity of State organs from Writs of Mandamus.

The Court

dispensed with this contention by saying simply:

"We find

no merit in this contention as applied to a Mandamus proceeding."

392 P.2d at 624
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-19POINT IV
THE RELIEF SOUGHT HERE BY APPELLANTS IS NECESSARY FOR
THEIR CONTINUED OPERATION AS A LEGITIMATE BUSINESS.
On January 19, 1981, this Court, in the companion cases of
Redwood Gym v Salt Lake County Commission, 624 P.2d 1138
(Utah 1981) and Hollingsworth v The City of South Salt Lake,
624 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1981) held that city and county ordinances
prohibiting the giving of massages to members of the opposite
sex were valid, even though they might put individual massage practitioners out of business, if they were necessary to
prohibit prostitution and other illegal acts.

Within one

month from the date of that decision, the State of Utah passed
an alternative regulation scheme, to achieve the same overall
goals without forcing legitimate massage operators out of
business.

That this act preempts the field is evident from

the fact that both Salt Lake County and the City of South Salt
Lake have since amended their massage ordinances to exempt
those who are licensed by the State of Utah.

It is of utmost

importance to those who practice the legitimate business of
massage in this state that the state commence the issuing of
licenses under the act.
In addition, §58-47-5 U.C.A. makes it unlawful to practice
massage without a license issued by the state.

It now appears

that all those who engage in the business of massage in Utah
are doing so illegally and may be subjecting themselves to
possible prosecution, although that prosecution may not be
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successful, given the correct state of the law.

In the case

of State Ex Rel. Board of Exam in Optometry v Lawton, 523 P.2d
1064 (Okla 1974), the court, in referring to the state's
declaratory judgment statute, said:
The legislature intended for factual situations
such as this to come within the confines of the
statute. It is apparent from a reading of the
statute that a prospective litigant need not hazard
the breach of a particular statute as a eondition
precedent to the bringing of an action under the
term of the declaratory judgment statute. The
statute provides the determination may be made
either before or after there has been a breach
of any legal duty or obligation. The fact that
Lawton could be subject to criminal prosecution
and lose his license if he were found to be in
violation of the statute certainly renders it a
matter of justiciable controversy. The. practice
and business affairs of Lawton should not be inhibited or held in suspense while he waits to see if
the Board construes his office location as a
violation of the statute, and if so, whether it
will decide to act against him. 523 P.2d at 1066.
As with the Oklahoma Plaintiff, Appellants herein are taking
the risk of being put out of business or of being criminally
prosecuted while they wait for almost another year to see if
the legislature will act to correct its mistake, as the
Attorney General suggests.

That is just the kind of absurd

consequence the Courts can and should avoid by using inherent
and statutory powers to make the law work.
CONCLUSION
This Court should enter its order construing the Massage
Practice Act of 1981 in such a way as to allow it to make
sense, and in harmony with the obvious intent of the legislature.

In the alternative, the case should be remanded to
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-21the District Court for Salt Lake County for the purpose of
taking testimony regarding legislative intent so as to allow
construction of the act.

Once such action is taken, it

becomes appropriate to issue a Writ of Mandamus directing
Appellees to do their statutory duties.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

~O""day

of March, 1982.

W. Aridrew McCullough
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed 2 true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief of Appellants, postage prepaid, to
David L. Wilkinson, Attorney for Defendants and Appellees,
State Capitol Building,

Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
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